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Recent Development
In Search of an Elixir: What Ails the
Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe and How to
Use the Competition Laws to Cure It
Jonathan A. Hareid*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 2008, the European Commission
released its preliminary findings in a study investigating a
perceived lack of competitiveness in the pharmaceutical
industry in Europe.1 The study found, among other things,
that brand-name drug manufacturers (which the report
terms “originator companies”) engage in a variety of tactics
to delay the entry of generic drugs onto the market.2
The Commission’s study comes on the heels of its 2005
decision against AstraZeneca.3 In that matter, the
Commission found that AstraZeneca, a brand-name drug
company, had violated Article 82 of the European
Community Treaty and Article 54 of the European
© 2009 Jonathan A. Hareid.
*J.D. 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. in pharmacology
expected 2009, University of Minnesota. Jonathan Hareid is a student in
the Joint Degree Program in Law, Health & the Life Sciences. He was an
Articles Editor on the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology in
2006–07. He thanks Professor Ralph Hall for helpful comments and
assumes responsibility for any errors or omissions.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL,
EUROPEAN
COMM’N,
1. COMPETITION
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(2008),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preli
minary_report.pdf [hereinafter COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL].
2. Id. at 7–10.
3. Commission Decision 2006/857, art. 82 and art. 54, 2006 O.J.
(L332) 24 (EC and EEA)(summary of the decision; the full text of the
decision
is
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37507/en.p
df) [hereinafter Commission Decision].

727

HAREID JA. In Search of an Elixir: What Ails the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe and How
to Use the Competition Laws to Cure It. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 727-746.

728

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 10:2

Economic Area (“EEA”) by a pair of practices relating to
patent extension and regulatory marketing authorization for
the company’s proton-pump inhibitor drug, Losec.4 The
Commission found that AstraZeneca’s practices were aimed
at keeping generic competitors from entering the
marketplace.5
In the United States the Hatch-Waxman Act governs the
relationship between brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers and has been subject to various abuses by
both camps. The intellectual property and regulatory
framework is similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act in Europe,
although with some differences. The AstraZeneca decision
and the European Commission’s recent report suggest that
just as the basic legal framework is similar in the United
States and Europe, abuses of the framework, with anticompetitive consequences, are another common element on
both sides of the Atlantic.
The AstraZeneca decision provides precedent for
applying the competition laws to restrain these abuses, and
rightly so. However, while the Commission’s report seems to
fault brand-name manufacturers for most of the problems,
the true situation is likely more complex. Generic
manufacturers are likely parties to some anti-competitive
practices too. Moreover, the entire pharmaceutical industry
is facing unique challenges in today’s economic and
regulatory climate. Hence, this paper argues that the
competition laws should be applied with care and attention
to the true situation the industry faces. A complete solution
involves a package of legal and regulatory overhaul of which
judicious application of the competition laws is only a part.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN
UNITED STATES

THE

Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”)6, a drug maker must obtain approval from the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) before a new drug is
4. Id. at 198.
5. Id. at 195.
6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
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introduced into interstate commerce in the United States.7
Approval requires submission of extensive preclinical and
clinical studies demonstrating the drug’s safety, efficacy,
and pharmacological properties.8 Hence, obtaining FDA
approval is quite time-consuming as well as expensive. The
total time required for drug testing and approval is between
three and twenty years, with an average of about eight and
a half years.9 Estimates of the total cost of drug approval
vary, but at the high end the total cost could be over $800
million.10
To capture the most economic value from an approved
drug, a drug company must obtain one or more patents on
the drug. A patent gives the patentee the right to prevent
others from making, using, selling, or importing the
invention into the United States.11 This right generally lasts
for twenty years from the date of filing of the patent
application.12 The patent thus gives the patentee a limited
monopoly in the invention.
A drug company must obtain a patent shortly after
discovery of the drug; excessive delay results in the
company being statutorily barred from obtaining a patent.13
However, the long process of getting FDA approval means
that a large portion of the patent term will have run before
the drug company gets FDA approval, and without FDA
approval, the company cannot market the drug
commercially. On the other hand, a competitor seeking to
manufacture a generic version of the drug has to get FDA
approval too, and any sort of testing would ordinarily be an
infringement of the drug patent. So even after the drug
patent expired, there would be a delay before any generic
version could come on the market because only then could
a generic drug maker begin to work on FDA approval. Thus,
7. Id. § 355(a).
8. Id. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(c)(2)(ii), (v) (2008).
9. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising
Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REV. DRUG
DISCOVERY 417, 418 fig.1 (2004). The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) maintains that the average time is
14.2 years in recent decades. Id.
10. Id. at 424–26.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
12. Id. § 154(a)(2).
13. Id. § 102(b).
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the regulatory process effectively distorts the commercial
exclusivity associated with drug patents, both at the front
end and the back end of the patent term.14
Congress sought to solve these problems by passing the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.15 The
law amended the Patent Act and the FDCA in several
respects. First, it enabled a drug manufacturer seeking
approval of a generic version of an already-approved drug to
file an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), which
would piggyback on the safety and effectiveness data
submitted by the original manufacturer and thus
streamline approval for generic drugs.16 This eliminated the
necessity for generic manufacturers to do all the same
testing on the same drug that the original manufacturer
did, which seemed like wasteful duplication. Second, the
law enabled patent term extension for products subject to
FDA approval to enable the original manufacturer to regain
some of the patent term lost during the FDA approval
process.17 Third, the law created a safe harbor from patent
infringement for uses of patented inventions to develop
information for submission to the FDA for approval of a
product, which enabled generic manufacturers to do the
research and testing required for FDA approval while a
brand-name drug is still under patent.18
Finally, the law included provisions to expedite patent
litigation over generic drugs and incentivize generic
manufacturers to challenge drug patents. Specifically, the
law provides that an ANDA filer must certify that (1) the
original drug patent information has not been filed, (2) the
patent has expired or will expire and the ANDA filer will not
begin commercial marketing until after expiration, or (3) the
patent is invalid or will not be infringed.19 If the ANDA filer
asserts that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed
14. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–71 (1990).
15. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f).
18. Id. § 271(e)(1).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
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(known as a Paragraph IV certification), this assertion is
considered a technical act of patent infringement, and the
brand-name drug company (the patentee) has forty-five
days to bring a patent infringement suit against the ANDA
filer; if no suit is brought, the FDA may approve the ANDA
immediately.20 If the patent holder does file suit, the FDA
may not approve the ANDA for thirty months21 or until a
court declares the patent invalid.22 This enables patent
disputes to go directly to court without waiting for the
generic company to actually begin manufacture or file a
declaratory judgment action. Moreover, to encourage
Paragraph IV certifications, the first ANDA filer to
successfully use a Paragraph IV certification gets a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity during which the FDA
cannot approve other ANDAs.23 This incentivizes generic
drug makers to challenge brand-name drug patents and
presumably enhances the general availability of generic
drugs, which are cheaper and benefit consumers.
The ANDA provisions have been subject to a variety of
practices with potential anti-competitive effects. Many of
these practices are attempts by brand-name drug makers to
delay the availability of generic versions of their drugs.24
While some of these strategies are legitimate business
tactics, others undoubtedly rise to the level of abuse of the
Hatch-Waxman provisions or violation of the antitrust laws.
For example, some brand-name manufacturers have
obtained additional patents on their drugs in order to
trigger additional thirty-month stays.25 One brand-name
manufacturer tried unsuccessfully to assert copyright
infringement against the ANDA filer because the generic
manufacturer is required to use the same labeling as the
Sometimes
brand-name
original
manufacturer.26
20. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
23. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
24. For an in-depth case study of two brand-name companies’
strategies to delay the onset of generic competition to their blockbuster
drugs, see Daniel Gorlin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
26. See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharm.,
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manufacturers have tried to use an FDA procedure known
as the citizen’s petition to prevent approval of an ANDA.27
Brand-name manufacturers may suddenly withdraw their
marketing authorization for particular dosage forms of a
drug just before a generic manufacturer is about to obtain
ANDA approval for that dosage form, thereby preventing the
ANDA from being approved because there is no original
application for the ANDA to piggyback on.28
Finally, many patent infringement suits triggered by
ANDAs are settled with a payment from the brand-name
manufacturer to the generic company.29 Such a payment,
called a “reverse” payment because it flows in the opposite
direction a normal patent settlement payment would (i.e.,
from accused infringer to patentee), is frequently
accompanied by settlement provisions that involve the
generic manufacturer refraining from manufacturing the
drug for a certain period of time. This raises antitrust
scrutiny because the effect of such agreements is to reduce
competition in the drug market. Courts and scholars have
differed over how to approach the legality of reverse
payments in light of the antitrust laws.30
The abuses have not gone unnoticed by Congress or the
Federal Trade Commission. In the Medicare Modernization
Act of 2003, Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman
provisions to curb some of the abusive practices, including
limiting brand-name companies to one thirty-month stay
per ANDA.31 The law mandates Federal Trade Commission
Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000).
27. See S. REP. NO. 109-266, at 136–47 (2006) (report for an
appropriations bill noting a sharp increase in the occurrence of citizen
petitions and attributing many of these petitions to attempts to delay the
marketing of a generic version of an existing drug).
28. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d. 408,
414–18 (D. Del. 2006).
29. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d
Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th
Cir. 2003).
30. For an excellent up-to-date summary of various approaches courts
and scholars have taken to the reverse payment question, see Erica N.
Andersen, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over ReversePayment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of
2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015 (2008).
31. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
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review of agreements between brand-name and generic
manufacturers,
and
between
different
generic
manufacturers, that are the result of ANDA filings with
Paragraph IV certifications.32
B. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS IN
EUROPE
As in the United States, a drug manufacturer must
obtain regulatory approval to market a pharmaceutical
product in Europe. This is done in one of two ways. First, a
drug maker may apply with the European Medicines Agency
(“EMA”) for an authorization that covers all member
states.33 Second, the drug maker may obtain approval from
an individual member state and later obtain authorization
from all the others through the Mutual Recognition
Procedure (“MRP”).34
As in the United States, a company may also seek
patent protection on its drug to obtain the economic
benefits of a limited monopoly right. However, there is no
single European Community patent. The European Patent
Office handles patent applications in a centralized way, but
after the patent issues, the rights afforded are defined by
national patent laws and must be enforced separately in
each member state.35
The European Community has adopted some, but not
all, of the features of the Hatch-Waxman regime governing
generic drug approval in the United States. As in the United
States, it is possible for a company seeking approval of a
generic drug to piggyback on the safety and effectiveness
data submitted by the original manufacturer.36 Also, the
original manufacturer can get a patent term extension,
called a Supplementary Protection Certificate (“SPC”), to
recoup some of the patent term lost during regulatory
approval.37
Originally, the patent laws of some European countries
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448–2457 (2003).
32. Id. §§ 1111–1118.
33. Council Regulation 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L136) 1 (EC).
34. Council Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L311) 67 (EC).
35. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 6.
36. Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L136) 35 (EC).
37. Council Regulation 1768/92, 1992 O.J. (L182) 1 (EC).
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did not exempt testing and other activities by generic drug
companies for obtaining regulatory approval, and the
European Court of Justice had upheld injunctions against
generic companies based on patent infringement theories.38
However, the European Parliament and Council recently
enacted a Community-wide analogue to the safe harbor
provision in the United States that permits generic drug
testing during the patent term for purposes of obtaining
regulatory approval.39 However, as yet there are no
analogous provisions to those in the United States providing
an immediate route to the courts upon ANDA filing,
Paragraph IV certifications, thirty-month stays, or 180-day
marketing exclusivity for successful generic challengers.
C. THE ASTRAZENECA DECISION
It is natural to ask whether the various abuses aimed at
keeping generic drugs off the market, well-documented in
the United States, have occurred in Europe as well. A clear
answer came in 2005, when the European Commission
fined the pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca sixty
million euros for abuse of a dominant position, in violation
of Article 82 of the European Community Treaty and Article
54 of the EEA, relating to the company’s conduct in relation
to its blockbuster drug Losec (generic name omeprazole,
which is sold as the blockbuster drug Prilosec in the United
States).40 The conduct was aimed at preventing other
companies from manufacturing generic versions of Losec, a
proton-pump inhibitor drug.41
First, the Commission had to define the relevant
market. The Commission noted that in the pharmaceutical
sector price competition is less important than non-price
competition for two reasons.42 First, the price of drugs, even
patented drugs, is largely controlled by national health
authorities who are the sole buyers in each country (i.e.,
38. See Case C-316/95, Generics BV v. Smith, Kline & French Labs.
Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-3929 (upholding injunction against generic drug
company against various challenges based on European Community
Treaty provisions).
39. Council Directive 2004/27, supra note 36, art. 10 at 39.
40. Commission Decision, supra note 3, at 198.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id. at 86–88.
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monopsony buyers).43 Second, the one who chooses a drug
is not the payer but the doctor or other health care
professional.44
Thus, the Commission relied on product characteristics
as well as price pattern substitutability to define the
relevant market and determined that the relevant product
was Losec itself, since omeprazole is a one-of-a-kind drug
with a unique mechanism of action.45 As for price pattern
substitutability, the Commission noted that in the pertinent
timeframe a similar class of drugs, the histamine H2
receptor blockers, ostensibly exerted no competitive
pressure on Losec because the latter’s market share kept
growing in spite of the fact that it generally cost more than
the H2 blockers.46 Therefore, the relative product market
was that for Losec itself.47
The Commission held that the relevant geographic
market was each nation in which the drug was sold, since
the different purchasing policies of each national health
authority tended to define markets of national scope.48
The Commission decided that AstraZeneca held a
dominant position in the relevant markets because
omeprazole was the first drug of its kind so the company
enjoyed a first mover advantage.49 For this reason, and
because of AstraZeneca’s patent rights, it had a strong
bargaining position even against monopsony buyers.50
The first abuse involved submission of misleading
information by AstraZeneca to national patent offices and
authorities of various member countries for purposes of
obtaining SPC protection to which the company was not
entitled.51 The Commission held that this was abuse of a
dominant position because it was aimed at delaying the
availability of generic versions of Losec.52
The second abuse involved the selective de-registration
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 86.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

89–90.
94–95.
114.
113.
120–21.
123–24.
135.
166–67.
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of marketing authorization of a particular formulation of
Losec, specifically a capsule, and the simultaneous
registration of a different formulation in tablet form.53 While
AstraZeneca argued that it was merely making a business
decision to switch dosage forms, the Commission relied on
documents from the company premises to determine that
there was no purpose for the switch other than to delay the
market entry of generic versions of Losec, some of which
were poised to gain marketing authorization of a capsule
version of omeprazole.54 The Commission was swayed in
part by the fact that AstraZeneca had only made this switch
in countries where it was likely to delay the onset of generic
competition.55 Hence, the Commission determined that the
selective de-registration was also abuse of a dominant
position.56
D. THE RECENT COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY
The Competition Directorate-General, a branch of the
European Commission, plays a role parallel to that of the
Federal Trade Commission in the United States: to enforce
the competition laws, analogous to the antitrust laws in the
United States, in order to promote competition and efficient
markets in the European community for the benefit of the
economy and consumers.57 The Competition DirectorateGeneral is currently investigating the competitiveness of the
pharmaceutical industry in Europe. Preliminary findings
were made public on November 28, 2008.58 A final report is
expected to be ready in summer 2009.59
The investigation was motivated by perceptions that the
number of novel drugs on the market was declining and
53. Id. at 170.
54. Id. at 168–72.
55. Id. at 172.
56. Id. at 186.
57. Directorate
General
for
Competition,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2009).
58. COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1.
59. Pharmaceuticals
Sector
Inquiry,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index
.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
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that there was often a delay between patent expiration on a
pioneer drug and the availability of a generic version.60 The
findings confirmed that both perceptions are accurate.61
The research revealed that brand-name drug manufacturers
(or originator companies, as the report refers to them)
engage in a variety of tactics to delay the entry of generic
drugs into the marketplace, including accumulating
multiple patents (“patent clusters”) on the same drug (1300
patents on a single drug in one case), suing generic drug
companies for patent infringement, making settlement
agreements in patent infringement suits that have the effect
of delaying generic entry, and intervening in regulatory
procedures for the approval of generic drugs.62
The investigation calculated that generic entry lagged
behind patent expiration by an average of seven months for
the drugs studied.63 The investigators estimated that
generic drugs were initially priced twenty-five percent lower
than the brand-name drugs they replaced and that within
two years the average price of a generic drug was forty
percent lower than that of the originator drug on average.64
The researchers further estimated that payers would have
saved three billion Euros, or more than five percent of the
cost of the medicines, if generic versions had been available
immediately upon patent expiration.65
In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman regime
encourages patent litigation over brand-name drugs by
granting 180 days of marketing exclusivity to a generic
company that makes a Paragraph IV certification and
successfully challenges a brand-name drug patent and by
enabling the brand-name manufacturer to sue the generic
company for patent infringement upon making the
Paragraph IV certification.66 This system has had the
unintended consequence of encouraging settlements in
these patent suits that often involve a delay before the
generic company begins marketing and a reverse payment

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 7–10.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
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from the brand-name company to the generic company.67
These settlements have drawn scrutiny and lawsuits from
the Federal Trade Commission and a vigorous debate
among courts and scholars about how to analyze the
settlements under antitrust laws.68 Although the European
countries do not have analogous provisions, patent
litigation over drugs abounds in Europe; the Competition
Directorate-General’s findings noted close to 700 patent
cases involving the drugs included in the study.69 Although
generic companies won sixty-two percent of the cases that
came to a final judgment,70 the average duration of the
suits studied, 2.8 years,71 suggests the potential for these
suits to delay generic entry. Also, the research revealed that
these patent lawsuits often ended in settlement agreements
with anti-competitive consequences, as happens in the
United States. Specifically, of about 200 settlement
agreements scrutinized, forty-eight percent included
restrictions on the generic’s ability to market.72 Reverse
payments occurred in more than twenty of these
settlements, and the total value of these reverse payments
was over 200 million Euros.73
The investigators described the legal framework for
pharmaceutical products in Europe and how it might be
reformed. It was noted that both originator and generic
companies favor the creation of a single Community patent
and a specialized patent judiciary, changes in the regulatory
framework, and changes in pricing and reimbursement
rules.74

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See supra Part II.A.
See generally Andersen, supra note 30.
COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ASTRAZENECA DECISION: APPLYING COMPETITION LAW TO
CURB ABUSE BY ORIGINATOR COMPANIES
The Commission’s decision in AstraZeneca is a seminal
one in several respects.75 The upshot of the decision is that
it puts the competition laws to service in policing abuses of
the drug regulatory framework.
Doctrinally, the case holds that the relevant market for
a successful blockbuster drug includes only that particular
drug, at least where the drug has unique attributes like
omeprazole that render it relatively insensitive to price
competition with similar drugs. If so-called “me-too” drugs
are available, that is, other drugs of the same class with
very similar pharmacological properties, perhaps these
drugs would have to be included in the relevant product
definition. But where a drug is the only one of its kind, it
should be relatively easy to show that the manufacturer is
in a dominant position after AstraZeneca. Moreover, even
though the buyer may be in a monopsony position because
of nationalized health care, the maker of a one-of-a-kind
drug has plenty of bargaining power if the drug has an
important function. Because no one can force a company to
manufacture a drug, the maker of a blockbuster drug
probably has the upper hand. Thus the Commission was
probably correct that AstraZeneca was in a dominant
position.
The more important question is whether the company
abused its dominant position. Article 82 provides some
examples of abuse of a dominant position:
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production,
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no

75. For an excellent analysis of the AstraZeneca case, see Matteo
Negrinotti, Abuse of Regulatory Procedures in the Intellectual Property
Context: The AstraZeneca Case, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 446 (2008).
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connection with the subject of such contracts.76

Neither of AstraZeneca’s practices, the misleading
information to obtain SPCs and the selective de-registration,
seem to fit into these pigeonholes. However, Article 82
indicates that abuse “may” consist of these practices,
suggesting that the listed abuses are not exclusive.77 The
Commission decision makes clear that “abuse” is not
confined to the listed examples.
Moreover, American antitrust law has condemned
practices similar to the ones at issue. For instance,
fraudulent procurement of a patent is a violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act if the other elements of
monopolization are present.78 Also, the Federal Trade
Commission has determined that brand-name drug
companies that improperly list patents for purposes of
obtaining thirty-month stays and delaying generic entry
violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.79
Thus, to the extent that AstraZeneca did mislead patent
officials to obtain patent extensions to which it was not
entitled, the abuse would likely violate the American
antitrust laws.
As for the selective de-registration of Losec, a similar
case in the United States involved a brand-name company
switching approved formulations in anticipation of a generic
entry.80 The court held that this could be a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, subject to a rule of reason
analysis.81 Under a rule of reason analysis, a court weighs
all the circumstances of a case to determine if a particular
practice is an antitrust violation, including such factors as
information about the relevant business; the practice’s
nature, effects, and history; and the presence of market

76. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, art. 82, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 65.
77. Id.
78. See Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 175 (1965).
79. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003); Biovail
Corp., 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002).
80. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d. 408,
416–17 (D. Del. 2006).
81. Id. at 420–24.
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power.82 This analysis is to determine if the practice is procompetitive or anti-competitive.83
It is evident, then, that antitrust law in the United
States has been applied to practices such as those
AstraZeneca used, so the Commission’s application of the
competition law had foreign precedent. Indeed, the
Commission’s use of Article 82 is a step toward
harmonization of American and European law regarding
efforts to forestall generic drug entry.
It is important for courts to be able to distinguish
legitimate business strategies from illegitimate ones.
Obtaining SPCs or switching approval for drug formulations
could certainly be part of legitimate business strategies. The
Commission Decision seemed to recognize this in that it
noted that a change in market authorization for a
formulation would not normally be considered an abuse.84
Critically, the Commission based its conclusions on both
practices on the fact that they were aimed at delaying
generic entry into the marketplace.85
To determine exactly where the line is between a
legitimate business practice and abuse of a dominant
position, it is instructive to examine another recent case,
SYFAIT v. GlaxoSmithKline.86 In that 2005 case the
European Court of Justice held that a refusal by a large
pharmaceutical company to fill orders from a wholesaler
was not necessarily abuse of a dominant position.87 The
Court noted the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical
industry, including the large framework of legal regulation,
the economics of the industry, and the consequences of
parallel trade for consumers.88 The Court held that a
restriction on parallel trade based on a refusal to supply to
a wholesaler beyond its specific needs was not an abuse if it
was “reasonable and proportionate.”89 The Court
82. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2712–13 (2007).
83. Id. at 2713.
84. Commission Decision, supra note 3, at 170–71.
85. Id. at 145, 175.
86. Case C-53/03, Syfait v. Glaxo Smith Klein AEVE, 2005 E.C.R. I4609 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs).
87. Id. ¶ 105.
88. Id. ¶¶ 75–100.
89. Id. ¶ 100.
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determined that in the particular case at hand this
condition was satisfied because the restriction on parallel
trade would be minimal and the company needed to
maintain enough supply on hand for orders from other
wholesalers.90 The Court noted that a refusal to supply
might be found to be an abuse of a dominant position if it
had anti-competitive effects other than a minimal
restriction on parallel trade.91
The words “reasonable and proportionate” are Delphic;
they indicate in appropriate Article 82 cases an analysis is
taken similar to the rule of reason that American courts
use.92 Moreover, the case suggests that courts should
consider the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical industry
in this analysis.
Viewing AstraZeneca through the lens of SYFAIT, then,
it is difficult to fathom how supplying misleading
information to patent offices could qualify as a reasonable
and proportionate measure. It seems axiomatic that
conduct that is independently wrong or unlawful is not
reasonable and proportionate. Changing the marketing
authorization for a drug formulation, on the other hand,
could easily be regarded as reasonable and proportionate if
there was a business justification other than stalling
generic competitors. The Commission was heavily swayed
by the fact that AstraZeneca had only changed its
marketing authorization in countries where this move
would have the likely effect of preventing impending generic
approval. From this fact it might be inferred that
AstraZeneca’s main motive was to stymie generic
competition.
AstraZeneca and SYFAIT offer twin lessons to
pharmaceutical companies and courts. The first is that in
Europe, as in the United States, more or less overt efforts to
prevent generic drug approval run afoul of the competition
laws. If a particular action seems likely to restrain generic
competition, brand-name companies must take care to
document the legitimate business reasons for such action.
Second, a lesson for the courts is not to treat these cases
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 104.
92. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68 (1911).
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too superficially. In some cases, such as an attempt to
procure patent rights by misleading patent officials, the
conduct can be condemned without much ado. But in other
cases involving conduct not otherwise wrong or unlawful,
courts should determine if there is a legitimate business
reason for the conduct and if any anti-competitive effect
involved is reasonable and proportionate in light of such a
reason.
B. THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Competition Directorate-General’s pharmaceutical
sector inquiry reflects dissatisfaction on the part of policy
makers with the state of the pharmaceutical industry
today.93 Two questions emerge: (1) what ails the industry,
and (2) what can policymakers (including courts) do about
it?
In answering the first question, it is important to
understand the complexity of the problems. For example,
the inquiry made the preliminary findings that the number
of new drugs going to market has been declining lately, and
that generic approval often lags behind patent expiration on
these drugs.94 Even putting these two problems side-byside, however, the preliminary report did not acknowledge
that they involve conflicting priorities. Because generic drug
approval brings competition to the marketplace and hence
reduces the price of a drug, a necessary consequence is that
anything that speeds up generic approval tends to reduce
incentives for originator companies to discover new drugs.
While the Competition Directorate-General’s findings
seemed to focus on examples of practices by brand-name
drug manufacturers that thwart generic competition,95
generic companies are involved in some anti-competitive
practices too, such as collusive settlement agreements to
patent litigation suits. Brand-name manufacturers face a
host of problems of their own: fewer new drugs in the
approval pipeline, competition from generics, a less-friendly
regulatory environment, and the potential changes in policy
the new U.S. presidential administration and Congress
could enact such as drug price controls or re-importation of
93. See generally COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1.
94. See supra Part II.D.
95. See supra Part II.D.
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drugs from Canada.96 Many drug companies are directing a
larger portion of their drug development efforts and sales
toward developing countries such as China and India, in
part because of the less favorable legal and regulatory
environments in both Europe and the United States.97
Optimal policy therefore requires not only setting a proper
balance between the brand-name and the generic
industries, but also legal and regulatory reforms that make
the business environment more favorable for the whole
pharmaceutical industry overall.
The inquiry found about 700 patent litigation cases
involving the drugs studied.98 This suggests that adoption
of additional incentives to encourage litigation over drug
patents, such as the Paragraph IV certification and 180-day
marketing exclusivity for successful generic challengers in
the United States, is unnecessary since patent litigation
abounds even without these inducements. The inquiry
found that generic companies are already testing the limits
of patent rights, and successfully; generics won sixty-two
percent of the cases in which a final judgment was
reached.99 As in the United States, the inquiry found that
drug patent litigation often ended in settlement agreements
involving restrictions on the generic company’s ability to
market or reverse payments from the brand-name company
to the generic company.100 On the basis of this finding, the
Competition Directorate-General should begin to assume
the same role in policing these agreements as the Federal
Trade Commission in the United States does. While it is not
clear to what extent collusive settlement agreements
contribute to the lag in generic entry into the marketplace,
the situation in the United States indicates that these
agreements should be carefully monitored for anticompetitive effects.
To achieve greater savings from generic drugs, the
Commission should consider reform to the patchwork of

96. See Winds of Change, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 75–76; Racing
Down the Pyramid, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2008, at 76.
97. See Racing Down the Pyramid, supra note 96, at 76.
98. See COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 9.
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reference pricing, price caps, and other regulations that set
generic prices. Economists believe this system is less
effective at producing low generic prices than the free
market system in place in the United States.101
As
for
improving
the
business
climate
for
pharmaceuticals overall, the preliminary findings from the
inquiry identified several areas in which all stakeholders
agree reforms are needed: creation of a single European
Community patent, regulatory reform, and changes to
pricing and reimbursement schedules.102 There may be
limits to what policy reform can accomplish; some of the
industry’s problems may be the results of the blockbuster
business model having outlived its usefulness and the need
to adopt new business strategy. However, there is
widespread agreement that legal reforms are needed.
Last but not least, there is certainly a role for the
competition laws to play in drug policy. The sector inquiry
found that various practices with potential anti-competitive
effects are common in Europe, just as they are in the
United States.103 AstraZeneca and SYFAIT establish the
framework for applying the competition laws in the
pharmaceutical context.104 Here as elsewhere, it is
important for courts to see the laws not just as a tool for
preventing brand-name company abuses but rather as an
instrument for maintaining a proper balance between
brand-name and generic drug companies and encouraging
a favorable environment for the pharmaceutical industry
overall. To this end, in considering whether a particular
anti-competitive effect is reasonable and proportionate to
the business interests involved, a court might consider such
broad policy factors as the state of the brand-name industry
or the trend in new drug approvals. If the balance seems to
have shifted too far in favor of generic drug makers, for
example, a court might be less inclined to condemn a
particular practice by a brand-name company. Encouraging
new drug development and approval is just as important a
policy goal as encouraging generic approval. So in applying
the competition laws in pharmaceutical cases, courts
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Patently Absurd, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 82.
COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 1, at 13–14.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part III.A.
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should be as mindful of the policy background as SYFAIT
exhorted them to be of the factual background.
IV. CONCLUSION
The
AstraZeneca
matter
and
the
European
Commission’s findings both point to the unsatisfactory
condition of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe. There
is legitimate cause for concern over tactics by brand-name
drug manufacturers to delay the entry of generic drugs into
the market. However, the woes facing the drug industry are
complex and the brand-name companies should not be
singled out as the culprits. Rather, policy makers should
consider a whole package of legal and regulatory reforms to
improve the business climate for both brand-name and
generic companies.
One policy lever available to maintain a competitive
balance between brand-name and generic manufacturers is
the competition laws. As in the AstraZeneca case, the
competition laws can be used to restrain abuses of patents
or regulatory procedures intended to forestall generic
competition. However, courts should be mindful of the
challenges facing pioneer drug companies too and should
take care not to shift the balance too far in favor of generic
drug companies. Like the United States antitrust laws, the
European competition laws are a flexible instrument with
interpretive leeway that courts can bend to different policy
objectives as the situation requires. This has the advantage
of not requiring new legislation to implement new policy.

